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India launched its National Smart Cities Mission (SCM) in 2015 with the goal of transforming 
urban areas into more inclusive, sustainable environments. The program was a response to the 
needs of a rapidly urbanizing population which requires a radical transformation of the built 
environment in order to realize a more prosperous and egalitarian society. A total tendered 
amount of 1.84 lakh crore (24.6 billion USD) has been approved under the project, with new 
developments receiving funding across the country. However, the SCM has so far failed to live 
up to its promise in a number of respects. It has disbursed its funding through a grant structure at 
odds with a national strategic vision for smart urbanization. Furthermore, by stretching the 
definition of “smart cities” nearly beyond recognition, it has become a catch-all umbrella for new 
government funding to urban projects, rather than a push to make India’s cities digitized and 
more sustainable. This raises the question of whether it is appropriate for India to invest in smart 
cities right now, or whether this funding should instead go towards expanding the systems which 
provide essential basic services to the population first. Fortunately, the vision for the SCM can 
be modified in a way that new investments made under the program both meet the existing needs 
of the population and start building the foundation for a smarter, 21st century infrastructure. 
Indeed, this is necessary if the SCM and future urban development projects are to yield concrete 
benefits proportional to their costs. 
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 Smart Cities and Sustainable Development 
 
Since the middle of the 20th century, the world has experienced a wave of urbanization 
unprecedented in the history of mankind. As economic opportunities become increasingly 
centered in urban areas and mobility increases between cities and the countryside, billions of 
people now make their homes within vast agglomerations whose size could scarcely have been 
imagined as recently as a century ago. Since 1950 alone, the global urban population has risen 
from 751 million to 4.5 billion, and will likely reach 5.2 billion by 2030. This constitutes a near 
doubling of the global urbanization rate since 1950, from 30% to 57% today and an estimated 
60% by 2030. The number of people living in cities today already exceeds the global population 
in 1980, and the urban population in 2030 will surpass the global population in 1990. 
 
Urbanization has accelerated in every part of the world, but nowhere has it unfolded faster than 
in Asia, where the urban share of the population has tripled from 17.5% to 51.1% since 1950.1 
Within Asia, India is likely to make the greatest contribution to this growing urban population 
over the coming decades. Since 1950, the number of Indians living in cities has grown nearly 
eightfold, from 62 million to 482 million, while the overall urbanization rate has doubled from 
17.3% to 35%. Population growth is expected to continue until just before 2050, and an ongoing 
evolution away from the agriculture sector and towards manufacturing and services will coincide 
with this growth, pulling a larger share of the population into cities in a fashion similar to what 
China witnessed from 1980 onwards. In the coming decades, Sub-Saharan Africa will likely be 
the only region to add a greater number of urban residents to global totals than India, largely due 
to that region’s higher population growth rates. As soon as 2030, urban areas are expected to 
house 40% of the Indian population and be responsible for 75% of national GDP. The GOI 
estimates that handling India’s urban expansion efficiently could add as much as 1.5% annually 
to the country’s GDP. 
 
 
1 UN Population Division 
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With a high population, a shifting economy and an urbanization rate with plenty of room to rise, India will become 
one of the largest contributors to the world’s urban population over the coming decades, matched only by India and 
surpassed only by Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Bank. 
 
With cities increasingly serving as the stage upon which people from all backgrounds lead their 
lives, the condition of cities is becoming increasingly relevant to the overall prospects of 
achieving sustainable development. Urban residents often maintain higher living standards than 
their rural counterparts, placing pressure on society and the environment to meet their increasing 
demands. At the same time, however, resources can be delivered more efficiently to people 
residing in high population density landscapes, meaning city life has the potential to be more 
efficient and sustainable than alternatives. Navigating this balance will be a key challenge for 
urban planners and policymakers in the 21st century, one outlined in detail in the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals. SDG 11 calls on UN member states to make cities inclusive, 
safe, resilient and sustainable by 2030, featuring targets for measuring this achievement 
including improving access to affordable housing, expanding public transit systems, improving 
resiliency to disasters, and ameliorating air and water pollution from unsustainable energy and 
waste disposal practices. 
 
In recent years, the rise of so-called “smart cities” has presented an opportunity to accelerate 
these trends towards prosperous, inclusive sustainability. Smart cities embed advances in digital 
technology into every aspect of their infrastructure, leveraging Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) to the fullest extent possible to shape the urban landscape into a dynamic, 
continuously adapting system in which demands for all types of resources are analyzed and 
responded to in real time. For instance, smart cities could autonomously react to high ridership 
on a transit system by instantaneously dispatching more vehicles or directing users to take 
alternative routes, or they could interface with utility providers to better match demand for power 
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and water to delivered supply at any given moment. Implemented properly, smart cities hold the 
potential to reduce waste, improve the efficiency and equity of service delivery for urban 
residents, and accelerate investments towards environmental protection. In the push and pull of 
forces determining what global urbanization will mean for the future, smart cities will likely 
make a great contribution to the causes of economic mobility, social opportunity, and overall 
sustainability.2 
 
However, smart cities are no magic bullet. While their underlying technology does to some 
degree contribute to sustainability by improving resource use efficiency, it does so in a way that 
increases the throughput of that to which it is applied. As a result, smart city technology has a 
tendency to reinforce existing systems, which may or may not be sustainable at the scales 
required for today’s rapidly growing urban areas. For example, cities which invest in making 
their roads more easily navigable for autonomous vehicles may temporarily experience slight 
traffic improvements and reduced emissions, but this will induce demand for heavier reliance on 
personal vehicles in the future, a form of transport which is fundamentally incompatible with the 
population density required for a sustainable urban area. Furthermore, smart technologies will 
not be utilized to their full potential unless they are embedded within a mutually reinforcing 
system of data collection and responsive optimization, which itself requires a great degree of 
invisible investment as well as safeguards before it is released for the benefit of the general 
public. Therefore, policymakers wishing to introduce smart city innovations should first ask 
whether the form of infrastructure they are hoping to bolster is intrinsically sustainable, 
especially under the burden of the higher urban populations that are all but inevitable for the 
future. They should then consider investing in a broader digital ecosystem for their city, rather 
than a standalone intervention which provides little opportunity for synergies or external benefit. 
 
India’s Smart Cities Mission: Motivation, Design and Outcomes 
 
Faced with a future of continuing urban growth, challenges across the spectrum of sustainable 
development, and increasing pressure on existing cities to deliver opportunity and quality of life 
to their residents, the Government of India (GOI) under PM Narendra Modi launched the 
National Smart Cities Mission (NSCM) on June 25, 2015. With an initial funding level of 48,000 
crore INR (6.4 billion USD) over five years, a total of 100 cities were selected to take part in the 
NSCM. Cities which complete their projects are intended to serve as demonstrative examples for 
their peers of the power of incorporating smart city innovations. Ultimately, the success of these 
pilot projects is intended to spark a wave of public-private investment in further development of 
smart cities without the need for direct intervention from the central government. To this point, 
the NSCM has sparked a total of 1.84 lakh crore INR (24.6 billion USD) in tendered investment 
from both public and private circles for its projects across the country. 
 
India’s cities currently rank low in indices of development and sustainability, which the SCM 
has in part been intended to address. In 2019, IESE Business School created a global ranking of 
 
2 For further discussion regarding the development of smart cities, please review the working paper “Best Practices 
for Sustainable Smart Cities,” available at 
https://csd.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/ICT%20India/Papers/ICT_India_Working_Paper_57.pdf . 
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174 cities by “smartness,” which incorporated indicators for human capital, social cohesion, 
economic prosperity, governance, environment, mobility, urban planning, international outreach, 
and technology. Indian cities ranked between 153 for Bengaluru and 169 for Kolkata, with 
Mumbai and Delhi falling in between. Only Douala, Lagos, Caracas, Lahore, and Karachi ranked 
lower in the index, demonstrating the continuing challenges Indian cities face not just in 
becoming the hubs of technological governance envisioned by the SCM, but even in delivering 




Cities were selected on a competitive basis annually across the country for inclusion in the NSCM, for a total of 100 
over five years. With projects intended to last three years, completion has been scheduled between 2019 and 2023. 
Source: Praharaj, Sarbeswar.  
 
Cities were invited to submit proposals for a minimum of two projects through the NSCM. The 
first would be an area-based development project in which an existing location was retrofitted or 
redeveloped, as a way of providing a “lighthouse,” or a best practice model, to other parts of the 
city. The second would be a city-wide development project, aimed at impacting the entire 
population. Projects submitted under this guideline typically included city-wide ICT networks 
with the specific aim of improving monitoring of urban functions such as public safety, energy 
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usage, transit and traffic, or environmental conditions. To aid participants in developing their 
vision for a smart city, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) issued guidelines 
which encouraged cities to design projects promoting mixed land use, inclusive housing, 
walkable communities, open space, multimodal transport, transparent and responsive 
governance, and strengthening local identity, while applying “Smart Solutions” to these 
challenges to the fullest extent possible. Yet the MoHUA did not define what a smart city should 
be, offering cities infinite latitude to create their own definitions of “smartness” and design 
projects that applied to them. In the Ministry’s reference note to MPs, Smart Cities were not 
defined by any reference to ICT or sustainability, but simply as “those that are able to attract 
investments.” 
 
Participating cities were selected through a “Smart Cities Challenge,” developed and conducted 
by the GOI in partnership with Bloomberg Philanthropies. A city assessment, given a 30% 
weight within the evaluation, examined each Urban Local Body’s (ULB) performance on metrics 
such as administrative and operational efficiency, and executed an appraisal of each city’s 
overall urban strategic vision, the sustainability and inclusiveness of this vision, and its plans for 
incorporating ICT into the urban landscape. On the other hand, a proposal-level evaluation, 
weighted at 70%, examined the merits of each city’s proposals on dimensions such as cost-
effectiveness, feasibility, innovation, scalability, and citizen engagement. Cities first competed 
against peers at the state level, after which state governments submitted nominees for inclusion 
to the national government. The 33 highest performing cities were chosen to participate in the 
first round, with other applicants invited to revise and resubmit their invitations annually until 
the total number of participating cities reached 100 by the final round. As a result of this process, 
cities have been chosen to participate in the NSCM from every single State and Union Territory 
in the country, with the exception of the newly formed Ladakh UT. The selected cities are 
collectively home to roughly 35% of India’s urban population, or around 130 million people. 
 
Once a city was chosen for NSCM inclusion through this competitive process, it was required to 
set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to coordinate financing and implementation of the 
proposed projects. SPVs were required to place their majority holdings in the hands of 
government bodies, with the stake of private investors limited to 40%. As a condition of 
receiving seed funding from the GOI, and matching funding from state governments, the SPV 
would be required to obtain the remainder of the funding for its projects via other means. 
Through this funding structure, an average of 200 crore INR (26.7 million USD) was allocated 
per city per year through public means, amounting to just under half of the funding requirement 
for all projects. However, the funding requirements varied widely between cities, from a 500 
crore INR budget in Lakshadweep to a 6000 crore INR budget in Chandigarh. With uniform 
funding budgeted for all cities regardless of their position within the mission, the remainder of 
the cost was recovered through municipal bonds issued on the financial markets, land use 
conversion charges, user fees, synergies with other government programs, sale of government 
assets, and corporate CSR initiatives. 
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Combined central and state government financial support amounted to slightly under half of the estimated total 
funding requirements for projects launched under the NSCM. As a result, participating cities were required to set up 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for the purpose of mobilizing new private sources of funding for these projects 
through a PPP model. Source: Aijaz, Rumi. 
 
Proposals for the SCM were largely developed by Urban and Local Bodies (ULBs) in 
partnership with consulting firms, with technical and financial advice from foreign governments 
and varying degrees of input from citizens and other stakeholders. These proposals were then 
approved by the SCM’s National-level Apex Committee, which additionally monitored project 
activities, recommended mid-project adjustments, and was responsible for releasing public funds 
to SPVs under the direction of a national mission director. Furthermore, each state managed its 
branch of the SCM through a High-Powered Steering Committee (HPSC), which provided 
guidance and a forum for the exchange of ideas for all the cities and projects under its purview. 
A final level of cooperation existed at the SPV level, with the convening of Smart City Advisory 
Forums (SCAFs) by SPV CEOs to encourage stakeholders to collaborate with each other. 
 
SCM projects were formally classified into two categories: area-based development and city-
wide development. City-wide developments were intended for the benefit of the entire urban 
area, and often featured the most innovative applications of ICT in the SCM with the greatest 
potential for inclusive benefits to the population. On the other hand, area-based developments 
involved intensive investment in a relatively small geographical area, intended to serve as a 
proof of concepts of smart urban renewal to surrounding municipalities, and could further be 
divided into three separate models: retrofitting, redevelopment, and greenfield development. 
Retrofitting projects installed new infrastructure in existing built areas of at least 500 acres, with 
the intention of improving efficiency and livability. Redevelopment, or “brownfield” projects, 
replaced an existing built environment of roughly 50 acres with a new one designed around 
principles of mixed-use development, increased density, and technological integration. 
Greenfield developments took vacant rural land or farmland outside of existing urban areas in the 
ballpark of 250 acres and constructed an entirely new built environment which integrated smart 
infrastructure into its design. The GOI’s initial vision for “100 new smart cities in India” hewed 
closely to the greenfield development model, but over time, cities have preferred implementing 
redevelopment and retrofitting schemes. This is not only because these models are less costly, 
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but also because the ULBs charged with designing and introducing projects naturally prefer 
investing in developments within the existing boundaries of their urban areas.  
 
 
The transport sector received the highest percentage of the total amount budgeted through the SCM, followed by 
energy and ecology, water and sanitation, housing, and economy. These categories were similar to those pursued 
under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) between 2005 and 2012, while IT, 
governance, and culture and heritage were introduced as new categories. Source: Centre for Policy Research India. 
 
Area-Based Development: Retrofitting 
 
Retrofitting schemes have often involved casting a vast net and implementing a highly diverse 
and not necessarily complementary set of projects in a specific, favored geographical region. The 
range of SCM investments in New Delhi City Centre (NDCC) is exemplary of this model. In a 
city with governance institutions fragmented across geography and a high level of inequality, 
NDCC was chosen as the site for the implementation of a high proportion of the city’s SCM 
projects because it had the highest level of existing IT infrastructure in the city, because it had 
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high levels of economic and cultural significance, and because the New Delhi Municipal Council 
had greater capacity than its neighbors, a track record of implementing prior smart projects, and 
a AA credit rating on the back of a track record of operating without debt, and even with a 
running surplus for several years. In theory, a project in this area would yield greater results 
because it would attract greater funding from private investment, would impact more people, and 
would be implemented more effectively. The outcomes of this success, highly visible to other 
municipal agencies such as the North, South, and East Municipal Corporations of Delhi, would 
then prompt these other actors to make their own investments in area-based development. 
 
The majority of funds tendered to Delhi under retrofitting schemes fell under the category of 
energy, as part of a large-scale rooftop solar and smart grid installation. Mobility and Parking 
was the next most popular category, followed by smart water and wastewater management. 
Meanwhile, individual projects varied widely. To take several examples, Funding under the 
SCM went to the 2017 opening of the Charkha Museum and Training Centre, a site meant to 
promote the cultural identity of khadi weavers and connect them to the heritage of the city. 
Public Amenities Centres (PACs) transformed public toilets in NDCC into hubs featuring clean 
water dispensers, cash machines, and even digital clinics, fully under the management of private 
companies. NDMC also partnered with the German company NextBike to install GPS-equipped 
bikeshare docks across NDCC, and inked a separate partnership with Yulu to provide e-bikes. 
Digital information and service panels were also installed in locations across NDCC, providing 
free data, wifi, and mobile charging points to pedestrians in the district in a fashion similar to 
New York’s LinkNYC kiosks. Finally, in an effort to alleviate traffic near Connaught Place, 
smart parking lots were introduced which featured displays showing current occupancy rates and 
were linked to a website and app which would allow drivers to remotely check availability in 
parking lots in the area. This is by no means exhaustive – Delhi has tendered a total of 1152 
crore INR (154 million USD) for 100 projects under the SCM, completing 89 so far – but it 
constitutes a reasonably fair summary of projects within the NDCC. 
 
Area-Based Development: Redevelopment 
 
East Kidwai Nagar, in the heart of south-central Delhi, is likely the most notable example of a 
redevelopment scheme implemented under the SCM. The mixed-use development, built over 86 
acres, includes 4700 apartments, 102,000 m2 of office space, a commercial center, and a 
secondary school, powered by a rooftop solar network which allows the entire development to be 
almost entirely carbon-neutral. Residents enjoy a large central green space and close proximity to 
public transit, two factors which contributed to the development’s receipt of the award for “Best 
Public Service Architecture in India” at the 2017-18 International Asia-Pacific Property Awards. 
However, the development has not been without its share of controversy, with concerns raised 
about water supply, design shortcomings, and the project’s poor fit with the city’s exist Transit-
Oriented Development (TOD) policy due to excessive provision of parking space. At a more 
general level, the project was criticized for introducing another gated community into Delhi’s 
urban fabric under the guise of sustainability. 
 
Mumbai’s Bhendi Bazaar project is another well-known foray into redevelopment funded by the 
SCM at a total cost of over 4000 crore INR. Under the direction of a local nonprofit, the 
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redevelopment will ultimately house 3200 families and 1250 shops by 2025, spread over a 16.5 
acre area featuring towers reaching as high as 41 stories. The redevelopment has been a vehicle 
to deliver formal ownership rights to residents of the district, many of whom had lived in 
dilapidated buildings vulnerable to natural disasters without formal title. The project, however, 
has on occasion been stalled due to complexities in negotiating land transfer from residents 
unwilling to vacate their homes, due in part to lack of trust that they will receive a guarantee of 
land title in return. 
 
Area-Based Development: Greenfield Development 
 
Greenfield developments show the SCM’s vision at its most ambitious, and paradoxically, at its 
most tenuous relationship to certain recognized practices in sustainable urban development. By 
building on large, untouched, and unbroken parcels of land, greenfield developments offer the 
opportunity to imagine and realize a technological, sustainable city from the ground up. Gujarat 
International Financial Tec-City (GIFT City), between Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar, shows 
Indian smart city greenfield development at its most ambitious. A project conceived in 2007, 
GIFT City was designed as an 886-acre international business hub specializing in fintech which 
will provide residential and office space comparable with other international business districts 
such as La Défense in Paris or Pudong in Shanghai. Upon completion, the development will be 
home to India’s tallest building, the 410-meter Diamond Tower. As India’s first greenfield smart 
city, GIFT City features a number of groundbreaking innovations in design and infrastructure. 
Designed to be entirely walkable, the district boasts an automated garbage disposal system and a 
centralized cooling system for the entire development which reduces energy requirements for air 
conditioning by an estimated 30-40%. The area will additionally be connected to the Ahmedabad 
metro system by 2024. Yet despite its ambition, GIFT City has encountered its share of 
problems, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, struggling to attract business 
tenants in an era of social distancing and remote work. 
 
Maharashtra’s Palava City is another highly-regarded greenfield development. A new 
development by the Lodha Group, Palava was named India’s no. 1 smart city by a 2017 research 
report. As of May 2020, the mixed-use development housed 200,000 residents, integrated 
transportation, waste, and utility management, a high ratio of green space, and a dedicated solar 
power supply. Palava II, due for completion in 2030, will host 7 million square feet of retail and 
commercial space and half a million residents, while Palava III, tentatively scheduled for 
completion in 2050, will up this to 40 million square feet of commercial space. Palava has been 
described, by some, as the ideal city, but it has been criticized by others as a segregated vision of 
the smart cities of the future, in opposition to the inclusion requirements of sustainability. For 
instance, the city’s squarely upper-middle-class residents are issued a community-specific ID 
care which controls access to the city’s services and facilities, and are promised a “smart 
surveillance” system to keep them safe from outsiders. The development, somewhat revealingly, 
describes itself as “Mumbai’s first and only golf-course-equipped residential township;” an 
activity that has nothing to do with either smartness or sustainability, let alone when taking place 
on a course built on expropriated farmland. At 40 kilometers from Mumbai, the new city is more 
of a retreat from urban life than an elevation of it, raising the question of who exactly India’s 
smart city model as currently formulated is intended to serve. 
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The final development model included under the umbrella of the SCM, city-wide developments 
are intended to benefit the population of the entire geographical area of the city, instead of 
limiting themselves to specific focal neighborhoods. City-wide developments within the SCM 
range from the miniscule to the transformative. Cities often used these proposals to attempt to 
introduce innovations such as smart water and power usage meters, develop Bus Rapid-Transit 
(BRT) networks, improve the network connectivity of transit infrastructure, or commission new 
technology in schools and clinics across the city. At the other end of the spectrum, city-wide 
projects could be as small as one case in Trivandrum which bought a total of 30 e-autos and e-
rickshaws equipped with GPS systems and gave them away to female drivers below the poverty 
line. The only standard for these projects is that their impact not be limited to a geographical 
subset within the city. 
 
Over the course of the SCM, nearly all cities have come to make meaningful investments in 
developing centralized big data command and control centers, referred to as “Integrated 
Command and Control Centers” (ICCCs), as part of their city-wide development strategy. 
Originally intended as a means to use real-time monitoring of big data to generate insights into 
urban trends and respond to events more quickly, ICCCs have also proven to be useful from an 
urban planning standpoint by generating dynamic data on the state of cities. Previously, cities 
were relying on data that was often several years out of date for their planning processes, such as 
Census data, which is updated only once every ten years. The first ICCC was established in 
Ahmedabad in February 2018, drawing on the successful implementation of a similar command 
and control center in Rio de Janeiro in 2016. The Ahmedabad ICCC received the SCM’s award 
for the most innovative smart city project following its introduction, and other cities quickly 
followed suit. The investment in ICCCs under the SCM is expected to reach 20,000 crore (2.76 
billion USD) by 2022. 
 
ICCCs may have become a universal feature of Indian smart city projects, but that does not mean 
they are all created equal. The most committed cities have dedicated upwards of 10% of their 
total smart city budgets to these centers, topping out at 16% of the total budget for Prayagraj. 
These cities can use their new data centers as hubs for collection of big data from audio, video, 
sound, sensor, and crowdsourcing devices, enabling a comprehensive integration, analysis, and 
response to this data which links services citywide, creates synergies across sectors, and 
improves coordination between levels of government. On the other hand, investment in ICCCs 
was under .5% of the total budget in cities such as Varanasi, Shillong, and Solapur. These cities 
cannot expect their ICCCs to do anything more than facilitate a handful of piecemeal 
technological services. 
 
Regardless of their size, Indian ICCCs operate according to a fairly standard, four-tier hierarchy 
which offers the potential both for high levels of data analysis internally and entrepreneurial 
involvement externally. At the foundation, big data is collected through an application and 
device layer and fed into the system. At certain levels, basic analysis of this raw data can be sent 
back to immediately influence user behavior, through tools such as electronic displays, public 
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announcements, or smartphone notifications. At the integration layer, this data is stored in 
organized relational databases, and made accessible for internal and external analysis and 
development via platforms such as web applications or open-source Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs). Data is analyzed and acted upon in the Platform and Analytics layer, which 
incorporates human data analysis as well as more advanced tools such as AI-powered predictive 
analytics to actually use incoming data to streamline the efficiencies of a city. Finally, the 
integrated data environment for the entire city is managed in a physical control center, whose 





83 of the 100 cities involved in the NSCM have implemented an Integrated Command and Control Center (ICCC) to 
gather, analyze, evaluate, and respond to big data inputs from across the urban area. ICCCs typically operate 
according to a schematic outlined in the above diagram. Source: Praharaj, Sarbeswar. 
 
ICCCs were largely founded to improve urban transport and surveillance, with better-equipped 
ones taking on responsibilities in other domains such as solid waste management, water sensors, 
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and smart street lights. However, activities such as flood monitoring or disaster management 
have rarely been assigned to them, despite the high climate risk faced by many Indian cities and 
the importance of fast, efficient, and coordinated responses in such situations. One exception to 
this role has been the COVID-19 pandemic, in which ICCCs were drafted into helping to 
coordinate an emergency nationwide response. ICCCs were charged with coordinating hospital 
bed requests, monitoring infection hotspots, managing oxygen capacity, directing ambulance 
services, developing web apps for contact tracing, and managing telemedicine lines, among other 
activities. Their record was mixed, but such an outcome was not unexpected for an untested, 
fledgling system that, in many places, has struggled to find staff adequately trained to use the 
massive amounts of information they are privy to. 
Challenges within the SCP 
 
Project Funding and Implementation 
 
Each member city within the SCM was expected to finish its projects under the program within a 
span of four years, yielding a series of completion deadlines for the project between 2019 and 
2023. However, many cities have lagged well behind this goal. Out of the 6387 projects tendered 
under the SCM so far, only 49% were complete as of September 2021. While the completion rate 
stands at over 80% in cities such as New Delhi, and Bangalore, 15 of the SCM’s 100 cities had 
completed under 20% of their projects, with a further 46 under 40%. In general, more developed, 
populous states saw higher project completion rates in contrast with lower rates in smaller and 
less developed states. This potentially points to a scarcity of local talent for SPVs in smaller 
states to draw on, and in particular, an inadequate degree of interstate support, communication, 
and collaboration within the framework of the SCM. 
 
 
Smaller and particularly northeastern states and UTs have issued fewer tenders and experienced a lower project 
completion rate than large states. This is indicative of limited capacity at the state and local level in these areas and 
inadequate technical support coordinated for their benefit at the national level. Source: Aijaz, Rumi. 
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One of the primary causes of these delays has been the SPV PPP model on which the entire 
implementation strategy of the mission was based. SPVs encountered frequent managerial, 
technical, and financial difficulties, which were complicated by delayed disbursement of funds 
and inadequate training in data handling and analysis. As of August 2021, only 23% of tendered 
funds had been released, mainly due to slowdowns on the  public side; the central government 
and state/local governments had only released 13% and 10% of tendered funds respectively, with 
no city receiving more than 45% of tendered funds due from state governments. In the most 
extreme example, the state of Telangana has not yet released any funds connected to the SCM. 
 
What has been the driver behind this unacceptably slow disbursement of funds to SPVs? On one 
level, release of funding has been delayed by the failure of states and UTs to mobilize the 
counterpart funding required under the guidelines of the SCM. ULBs have in some cases 
resorted to selling their own assets in order to meet the level of fundraising required of them to 
receive matching funds through the scheme. Municipal corporations have also experienced 
operational dysfunction which has hindered distribution of funds, and local fiscal weaknesses 
have incentivized local officials to postpone payments until their finances reached a more stable 
and consolidated position.  
 
 
Project delays have largely been caused by the requirement that SPVs mobilize counterpart funding before public 
funding is released. As a result, utilization of funds released for the project have ranged from near 100% in West 
Bengal to under 30% for Bihar and small UTs such as Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, 
and Daman and Diu. Source: Aijaz, Rumi. 
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SPVs are also partially responsible for failing to meet a high enough standard for municipal 
governments to feel enough confidence in their ability to perform the work demanded to 
distribute funding to them. In Panaji, for instance, the SPV went without a governing board for 
over a year, with four positions remaining vacant while the company has been faced with 
numerous auditing violations. ULBs have also been left in the dark about whether SPVs are 
intended to continue managing SCM projects after the conclusion of the mission or whether 
responsibility will pass to local governments. This deficit of planning for continuity and 
programmatic sustainability has reduced the commitment of local governments to projects 
undertaken through the mission. Perhaps most fatally for the prospects of the cooperation 
between SPVs and ULBs necessary for the success of the SCM, the very use of SPVs as primary 
implementors was heavily criticized as no more than a means of bypassing municipal 
governments and the democratic process. With SCM governance boards required to provide 
central and state governments with a majority of the seats, this design stood in stark contrast to 
the SCM’s marketing as an investment in empowering local governments. The separation of 
SPVs from the democratic process was made even clearer by the fact that the SCM included no 
grievance redress mechanism and no right to remedy for impacted city residents. These concerns 
around diluting the power of the municipal corporation were so serious that the ULBs of 
Mumbai and Navi Mumbai refused to participate despite the SCM’s potential development 
benefits. 
 
Over time, a deep conflict was revealed between the SCM’s strategic vision and its funding and 
operational structure. SPVs were required to develop a dedicated revenue stream and their own 
credit worthiness to gain additional funding. This led them to favor PPP projects with immediate 
market feasibility, not projects with the greatest potential benefit for sustainability or for poor 
and excluded populations. This led the SCM to drift towards funding the same kinds of physical 
revenue-generating infrastructure as prior urban renewal schemes, targeted towards areas with an 
ability to pay. This was made more prevalent by the fact that the SCM gave cities the latitude to 
define any project they wanted to as “smart,” further reducing differentiation between the SCM 
and earlier projects. Meanwhile, cities in later rounds of the program witnessed the instability of 
reliance on private funding and downsized the ambition of their projects to rely more on 
government grants. This may have helped these projects gain approval, but it did not help resolve 
the funding disbursement issue, making these projects even more prone to delays. At the same 
time, certain cities such as Bhubaneshwar and Thane made some of the most ambitious proposals 
in the entire SCM without providing any detailed information about their proposed sources of 
funding, even though a financial plan with itemized costs, resource plans, revenue and payback 
mechanisms, plans for cost recovery, and a financial risk mitigation framework were ostensibly 
required to successfully take part in the application process. It remains an open question why 
enforcement of compliance was so lax for these particular cities. 
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Cities shifted toward proposing less ambitious projects with smaller budgets with less reliance on market-based 
funding over the course of the SCM, partially due to uncertainty over the reliability of funding sources. This limited 
the impact of the SCM for more excluded populations and contributed to the SCM becoming a source of urban 




The SCM’s competitive application used a number of metrics to ensure that the individual 
projects selected for inclusion under the mission were the best performers on a strict and detailed 
rubric in alignment with the Mission’s vision and goals. This was intended to make certain that 
the projects funded under the mission were thoroughly conceived, detailed and thought out. 
What this process did not do was incorporate any metric for whether a project met the specific 
needs of a city, as it was assumed that cities would submit projects meeting their greatest 
development needs. Nor did it include a weight for the overall need of a city for development 
investment, as high-performing cities were anticipated to become “lighthouses” which would 
spark independent investment by municipalities not party to the program. Neither of these 
assumptions have so far been born out. The competition incentivized ULBs to design their 
projects to maximize the possibility of funding, maximizing their point totals under the rubric 
even when this pushed them towards low-priority projects which didn’t meet local needs. City 
residents had little meaningful input into the projects put forward, with Facebook likes and even 
Twitter impressions recorded as positive feedback to SCM proposals with no further inquiry. Nor 
did this model align submitted projects with a cohesive national strategy. While the projects 
funded may have all met the definition of smart development outlined in the SCM guidelines, 
actual smart development is a cumulative process requiring foundational infrastructure, 
investment in skill development and, last but not least, smart applications built upon these two 
pillars. The emphasis on individual projects through the SCM did not follow the required order 
of operations for building a smart city. 
 
Nor did the projects funded under the SCM necessarily fit international definitions of what 
should be considered as “smart.” For instance, Agra used its funds to found handicraft training 
centers for traditional embroidery and stone inlay. Coimbatore restored a number of lakes and 
invested in developing food kiosks, open plazas, fountains, and an ampitheater. Kavaratti 
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installed a rainwater harvesting system and a combi8nation compost-recycling-incineration 
center for solid waste. Prayagraj installed a plastic-to-diesel conversion plant, while Surat 
installed parking on highway medians. Solapur is simply redeveloping a sports stadium. These 
projects may have been considered high development priorities by the ULBs in charge, but they 
shouldn’t have been considered smart without the inclusion of a technological layer with the 
capacity to interface with residents or other city services.  
 
Nor were SCM projects examples of sustainable development, in many cases. The greatest red 
flags for sustainability have come in the transportation sector. Nearly 40% of the transportation 
budget under the SCM has gone to roads and parking lots, with only 2% dedicated to buses and 
13% dedicated to non-motorized transportation. Bhopal’s plans included a road-widening 
project, widely seem by modern urban designers as an engine for increasing traffic, sprawl, air 
pollution, and GHG emissions. These projects ultimately amount to an investment in an anti-
urban form of private transportation at the expense of sustainability in exchange for guaranteed 
economic returns, perfectly opposite to what the goals of a national smart, sustainable city 
mission should be. Projects such as Bhopal’s also resulted in high rates of eviction and 
displacement for residents of informal, vulnerable communities. In fact, projects in the Energy 
and Ecology space were permitted to pursue “beautification” projects, which some cities 
interpreted as carte blanche for funding slum demolitions. A total of 20% of the budget for 
housing-related projects was dedicated to slum redevelopment. Disruption is unavoidable in 
urban development, especially if existing living patterns do not meet standards of sustainability. 
But when no provision is made to provide existing residents rights and title over their land, 
displacement and homelessness are the likely result. With no measures taken to formally count 
the number of people displaced or made homeless by SCM redevelopment projects, it’s even 
possible that these investments caused a net decrease in the number of homes in some cities – in 
the middle of a national housing crisis. 
 
Ultimately, the intentionally vague language of the SCM was used to obfuscate the program’s 
outcomes in two separate ways. Describing projects with no technological involvement as 
“smart” allowed stakeholders to sell the SCM as a substantially more radical modernization 
program than it has become, regardless of whether any individual project met the principles of 
sustainable development or not. For projects which had nothing to do with sustainable 
development, casting the project as “smart” instead of “sustainable” to some degree dispelled 
scrutiny over whether these investments actually met the development needs of India’s urban 
areas. Yet India’s cities are in desperate need of investment in improving their sustainable 
development outcomes, as evidenced by the continued shortfalls in basic service delivery, 
infrastructure, and governance in the country’s urban areas. Many commentators have argued, 
not incorrectly, that India’s cities need to invest in becoming sustainable before they even think 
about becoming “smart.” Since smart technology only enhances the efficiency of existing 
systems, the underlying sustainability of them matters, especially in a high population growth 
environment where high demands will be placed on urban infrastructure in the coming decades.  
 
It’s not necessarily that insufficient funds were dedicated under the SCM to help meet the 
demands of sustainability. Rather, the competitive grant structure of the SCM has incentivized a 
fundamental misallocation of these funds. A full 80% of SCM funds have been dedicated to area-
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based development, covering incrementalist retrofitting as well as redevelopment and greenfield 
development schemes which only impact the tiny proportion of the population of participating 
cities – 10% of the total city area under the SCM, and as low as .8% in cities such as Pune. Only 
a small minority of the total budget was allotted to city-wide development schemes, which have 
a much greater potential for transformative, inclusive, and even “smart” impact. Funding 
shortfalls across the program clearly indicate that more was awarded to these area-based 
developments than was actually readily available, and that more could have been made available 
for “smarter,” more cost-effective city-wide plans by deemphasizing area-based development, 
provided similar levels of funding would have been available for scaling these up. 
In Pursuit of Smarter, More Sustainable Urban Development 
 
The SCM had the potential to be a transformative program when the idea for it first gained 
traction, but unfortunately, it was undermined from the start by a number of harmful design 
flaws which rendered it less capable of meeting the most urgent needs of India’s cities. The 
Mission’s PPP-reliant funding and implementation mechanism undermined trust among civic 
partners, while failing to deliver the timely funding necessary for projects to be completed 
according to the program calendar. Inadequate provisions were made to build the capacity of 
stakeholders to engage with the data flows generated by project infrastructure, diminishing their 
impact, and increased collaboration and cooperation should have taken place between states to 
narrow the geographic skills gap. The siloed, competitive grant process prevented projects from 
having synergies with each other within or between cities, and ULBs were incentivized to 
propose projects that maximized the probability of funding, rather than those which met their 
core development challenges. The program also pursued development in small areas with high 
existing levels of development under the theory that other areas would follow suit, without doing 
enough to elevate the capacity of municipalities not selected under the SCM. Finally, at a 
semantic level, the definition of “smartness” was blurred to the point that it had little to do either 
with technology or with sustainability, leaving cities to propose whatever projects might 
maximize the possibility of new revenue streams, especially from private sources. Some have 
even argued that the purpose of the SCM was not to develop Indian cities, but to rather develop 
their credit ratings to push them to draw more on private-sector financing in the future. At the 
SCM’s outset, some criticized the program for allegedly promoting inequitable development 
despite its stated mission, such as the State Government of West Bengal, which even briefly 
withdrew from the SCM before returning in a limited capacity. The flaws in the program mean 
that to some degree, these criticisms have been borne out in the end. 
 
The SCM has, nonetheless, produced some highly valuable takeaways. The most important of 
these has been the rise of ICCCs within India’s major urban centers. At their best, ICCCs can 
improve coordination in the messy, federalist relationship between state and municipality, while 
driving the integrative management of big data towards the goal of a smart, sustainable city. 
Boston’s ‘CityScore’ system is an excellent example of how data can be used to influence 
decision-making and policymaking in the short and long term, with real-time indicators on 
transport, safety, health and human services, and utilities applied by city government both to take 
immediate actions and plan future investments in a cycle of constant self-improvement.  
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At this point, the majority of ICCCs in India have not yet reached this level of ambition. Their 
applications so far have largely been limited to managing the surveillance and security of an 
urban area, and have mostly fallen under private management as an artifact of ULBs’ efforts to 
attract private funding under the constraints of the SPV model. This is concerning because in 
effect, the SCM has forced cities to sell one of their most valuable assets – their citizens’ data – 
for pennies on the dollar. The value of this big data will grow exponentially in the future, and 
public ownership of these datasets will pay back immense dividends in the form of new 
entrepreneurship and civic innovation.  
 
One potential reason that the SCM leaned so much on private-sector partnerships to implement 
its projects, rather than public agencies, is that designers were concerned that municipal 
governments would lack the capacity of the private sector to carry out the program. This is a 
reasonable short-term viewpoint, but for long-term smart city development, municipal authorities 
need to build the governance capacity and technological competence to manage such projects. If 
they do not yet have it, then investment should first go into making sure that they do before 
introducing innovations that they, let alone neighboring cities not selected under the SCM, will 
not be capable of maintaining or replicating. As the Smart City Guidelines succinctly put it, “the 
Smart Cities Mission requires smart people,” and the current structure needs to do more to 
cultivate and mobilize these people. Given India’s high levels of digital talent, promoting higher 
levels of civic entrepreneurship and technological volunteerism may be a good pathway to 
developing this capacity.  
 
As things currently stand, smart cities are not recognized as the independent political and 
economic entities they need to be to realize a cohesive vision of smart, inclusive, technological 
growth. ULBs are often only responsible for the most basic public services, with state 
governments using the excuse of a lack of municipal capacity to take responsibility over the rest. 
This further weakens municipal capacity, to the point that when ULBs are asked to execute 
projects requiring this capacity, they rely on external consultants who lack a personal or 
democratic connection to the city’s needs. To some degree, the SCM bought into a myth of 
permanently diminished municipal capacity by pushing SPVs to assume control over projects, 
but little evidence so far has suggested that SPVs have been an improvement on direct municipal 
control. Regardless of how flawed local political institutions are, attempting to streamline and 
reform them instead of bypassing them is worth it because a functioning, empowered, and 
unitary city government does not suffer from the misalignments of incentives that stunted the 
SCM and have hobbled solutions for so many of India’s other urban challenges. 
Municipal empowerment is important to building smart, sustainable cities, but so is confronting 
the anti-urban legacies which have helped make some of India’s cities so unsustainable. For 
instance, obsolete urban planning laws, such as Mumbai’s unreasonably low Floor Space Index 
(FSI) requirement of 1.33, are incompatible with dense, mixed-use, transit-friendly development. 
Urban economist Edward Glaeser noted that “cities grow upward or outward,” and Indian cities 
have been growing outward without meeting the resulting demand for basic services or 
infrastructure resulting from such growth. The outcome is sprawl, traffic, and poor public 
services. Such city-level challenges are a collective action problem, and India’s urbanization 
poses a collective action problem at the national level, but measures such as the 74th amendment 
enshrining decentralization and devolution in national governance make such macro-level 
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problems challenging to address at adequate scale. Gandhi may have viewed India as a country 
of 700,000 villages, but governance has to reflect the reality of the changing urban landscape. 
While local government needs greater capacity to execute a collective vision, empowering local 
governments and neighborhood committees with the formal power to guide national governance 
may be a structurally ineffective means of confronting national challenges. 
 
After the SCM 
 
If the SCM is intended to make an impact beyond the duration of the program itself, it needs to 
be converted to a long-term program. Low levels of development in Indian cities and limited 
governance capacity require a sustained commitment to social and economic transformation and 
avoidance of unrealistic promises. Such capacity takes time to develop, but governance capacity 
is the limiting factor to the success of the big data urbanism envisioned by the SCM. Capacity 
can be developed by expanding training programs for both SPV and ULB program officers, as 
well as funding them adequately and providing them with sufficient personnel and equipment. If 
the SPV model is maintained, the Mission should start by clarifying the disbursement chain from 
the central government to the state and local levels and from these lower levels of government to 
the SPVs to avoid future delays. The Mission should also investigate SPVs in laggard cities in 
depth to determine exactly what went wrong and what not to replicate. ICCCs should expand 
their responsibilities as capacity increases to manage a wider variety of urban services, and a 
focus should be placed on maintaining new smart infrastructure rather than issuing proposals to 
build more. Finally, cities should work with the SCM to align projects with city development 
priorities, to apply new financing tools such as new modes of taxation and municipal bonds, and 
to enhance data security and encryption standards across the project. 
 
New initiatives have already emerged on the horizon which address many of the SCM’s 
shortcomings. On February 23, 2021, MoHUA launched the National Urban Digital Mission 
(NUDM), an undertaking with the goal of building shared digital infrastructure in all of India’s 
urban centers through 2024. NUDM would apply open APIs to encourage interoperability and 
greater stakeholder involvement, and has already gained partnerships with urban governments, 
industry assocations, academia, civil society, and entrepreneurs. This new digital infrastructure 
platform would be integrated with current open government platforms such as Aadhaar, UPI, and 
GSTN as part of the consolidation of a new national digital ecosystem. Another new digital 
infrastructure platform is the India Urban Data Exchange (IUDX), developed jointly by MoHUA 
and IISc Bengaluru. IUDX will produce an open-source dashboard of data on all available urban 
indicators, gathering data from sources such as air quality monitors, flood sensors, bike docks, 
buses and bus stops, waste management vehicles, and crowdsourced reports from citizens 
themselves. A third data platform, SmartCode, will serve as an open repository for smart 
governance tools, sharing source code for successful applications. SmartCode will accelerate the 
civic technology development process by letting users manipulate solutions which have already 
been developed, helping cities avoid reinventing the wheel.  
 
Indian cities have struggled with ICT-driven service delivery models for some time now, as 
evidenced by the fact that 38 out of the 67 cities included under the Jawaharlal Nehru National 
Urban Renewal Mission, launched 2005 and relaunched in 2015 under the name of the Atal 
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Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), failed to develop the 
eGovernance portfolio expected of them. If limited technical capacity is the reason behind this, 
then initiatives such as the National Urban Learning Platform (NULP) can help improve local 
technical governance capacity by offering open training in areas such as wastewater 
management, data governance, climate best practices, and e-mobility. Under a different program, 
TULIP (Tata Urban Learning and Internship Program), MoHUA is working with Tata Trusts to 
train city officials to understand, analyze, and implement recommendations from big data. To 
this point, TULIP has sponsored 13,000 internships in 284 ULBs focused on data-driven 
governance. To help cities plan out their new ecosystems for data-driven governance, the GOI 
also introduced the DataSmart Cities and Data Maturity Assessment Framework, a set of 
guidelines tracking the steps cities need to take to gather, understand, and act upon big data.  
 
Finally, an array of initiatives continue to press forward to improve the delivery of basic services 
in urban India. Jal Jeevan Mission, announced in the 2021 budget, allocates 2.9 lakh crore INR 
(39.4 billion USD) to delivering an uninterrupted water supply to all 4378 ULBs in India, 
covering tap connections to 2.86 crore households and liquid waste management for the 500 
cities in the AMRUT program. AMRUT, which leans far less heavily on PPPs and private 
investment than the SCM, will also invest in developing urban green spaces and reducing 
pollution by incentivizing a switch to public transit and non-motorized transport. Phase II of 
Swachh Bharat was announced in February 2020, with a focus on entrenching the gains made in 
Phase I and managing wastewater in all cities, towns, and villages with populations under 
100,000. And Housing for All 2022, announced in 2015 otherwise known as Pradhan Mantri 
Awas Yojana (PMAY), aims to construct a total of 20 million affordable homes with full utility 




CSD Working Paper Series: Towards a New Indian Model of Information and Communications 







Aijaz, Rumi. “Digital reforms in urban India.” Observer Research Foundation, April 6, 2021. 
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/digital-reforms-in-urban-india/  
 
Aijaz, Rumi. “India’s Smart Cities Mission, 2015-2021: A Stocktaking.” Observer Research 
Foundation Special Report. No. 155, August 2021. https://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-
smart-cities-mission-2015-2021-a-stocktaking/  
 
Aijaz, Rumi. “The Smart Cities Mission in Delhi, 2015-2019: An Evaluation.” Observer 




Anand, Ashwathy et al. “An Overview of the Smart Cities Mission in India.” Centre for Policy 
Research, August 2018. https://cprindia.org/system/tdf/policy-
briefs/SCM%20POLICY%20BRIEF%2028th%20Aug.pdf?file=1%26type=node%26id=7162 
 
Berrone, Pascual and Ricart, Joan Enric. “IESE Cities in Motion Index.” 2019. 
https://media.iese.edu/research/pdfs/ST-0509-E.pdf   
 
Brookings India. “8 Graphs: Why Ajmer, Allahabad, Visakhapatnam have a long way to go 
before they become Smart.” August 30, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/research/8-graphs-
why-ajmer-allahabad-visakhapatnam-have-a-long-way-to-go-before-they-become-smart/  
 
Chakravarty, Debalina. “Government needs to revisit smart city challenges – Here’s why.” 
Financial Express, March 23, 2019. https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/govt-needs-to-
revisit-smart-city-challenges-heres-why/1524439/  
 
Euklidiadas, M. Martinez. “How India Wants to Become the Future of Smart Cities.” 
Tomorrow.City, June 14, 2021. https://tomorrow.city/a/how-india-wants-to-become-the-future-
of-smart-cities  
 
Gulati, Priyanka. “49% of over 5000 projects for smart cities unfinished as deadline nears.” 




Housing and Land Rights Network. “India’s Smart Cities Mission: Smart for Whom? Cities for 
Whom?” June 2017. https://www.hlrn.org.in/documents/Smart_Cities_Report_2017.pdf  
 
India Brand Equity Foundation. “Revitalising ‘India’s Smart City Mission.” March 31, 2021. 
https://www.ibef.org/blogs/revitalising-india-s-smart-city-mission  
 
CSD Working Paper Series: Towards a New Indian Model of Information and Communications 









Mane, Swatnil Rapnakar et al. “A Systematic Overview of India’s Smart City Mission.” 
International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology, February 25, 2021. 
https://www.ijert.org/a-systematic-overview-of-indias-smart-city-mission  
 
Ministry of Urban Development. “Smart Cities Mission Statement and Guidelines.” June 2015. 
https://smartnet.niua.org/sites/default/files/resources/smartcityguidelines.pdf  
 
QRIUS. “Is India Ready for Smart Cities?” February 22, 2015. https://qrius.com/is-india-ready-
for-smart-cities/  
 
Ravindran, Shruti. “Is India’s 100 smart cities project a recipe for social apartheid?” The 
Guardian, May 7, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/may/07/india-100-smart-
cities-project-social-apartheid  
 
Praharaj, Sarbeswar. “Development Challenges for Big Data Command and Control Centres for 
Smart Cities in India.” Data-Driven Multivalence in the Built Environment, January 2020. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12180-8_4  
 
Smart Cities Program Dashboard. https://smartcities.gov.in/dashboard  
 
Smart City Hub. “India’s 100 Smart Cities Mission is flawed.” November 17, 2017. 
https://smartcityhub.com/governance-economy/indias-100-smart-cities-mission-is-flawed/  
 




Unni, Aravind et al. “India’s cities need to be sustainable, not smart.” Indian Express, June 30, 
2021. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/india-smart-city-mission-7383242/  
 
Venkataramakrishnan, Rohan. “Everything you wanted to know about Narendra Modi’s 100 
smart cities.” Scroll, May 1, 2015. https://scroll.in/article/724297/everything-you-wanted-to-
know-about-narendra-modis-100-smart-cities  
